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Editor's Note 
Padraig 0 'Malley 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final 
sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not 
clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its 
laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.... This is not a way of 
life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging 
from a cross of iron. 
-Former u.s. President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 16, 1953 
The twenty-first century had hardly put its first fledgling year behind it when the promise of its possibilities, so endlessly recapitulated at the millennium's tum, 
were shattered. The television images of two huge Boeing 767 jets lumbering at low 
altitude across the skyline of a bright Manhattan morning, bellies full of baleful 
fuel, lifting their noses and ripping into the guts of the twin towers of the World 
Trade Center, symbols of New York's global stature, and the towers collapsing in 
the inferno of a towering rage, were replayed endlessly across our planet, imprint­
ing indelible memories of random mayhem, sudden death, and the once unthinkable 
was now an instant reality. 
9111 ushered in a new era, one that redefined the new century's connection with 
the twentieth century just as the madness of World War I redefined that century's 
connection with the nineteenth. It did more than destroy the twin towers; rupture 
America's belief in its invulnerability to attack; instill a sense of the dread of an 
invisible enemy that could strike without warning, directing its wrath at people, not 
armies, and not at the state but at its ordinary citizens, individuals and families that 
tried to live ordinary lives with a sense of safety in their surroundings. 
That morning dumped memories of the twentieth century into their own ground 
zero, consigned them to the dustbin of the past. Indeed, with our obsessive preoccu­
pation with the threats of imminent dangers - color codes indicating levels of ter­
ror alert, a president who announced that America arrogated to itself the right to 
take preemptive action against any country that appeared to pose a threat to its 
national security, a relentless and unforgiving search for weapons of mass destruc­
tion, which culminated in the invasion of Iraq on grounds that later proved to be 
baseless, the constant harping on regime change as a policy instrument, the elimina­
tion of "an axis of evil" becoming a religious-like obligation of a secular polity ­
the twentieth century was swallowed by the immediacy of the present. "Imminent 
threat" became the parlance of choice, although those who assiduously cultivated the 
threat of imminence increasingly found difficulty identifying where the threat was 
coming from and just how imminent something was that could not be detected. But 
the logic of the newly created insecurity argued that the less definable the threat, the 
greater the threat it posed. 
Padraig 0 'Malley is a senior fellow at the John W McCormack Graduate School ofPolicy 
Studies, University ofMassachusetts Boston. 
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The past counts for little. Not that we do not remember it ­ we do, but fleet­ new and "il 
ingly, and then we proceed to repeat its mistakes ­ or, worse still, to believe that the killing 
we cannot repeat its mistakes, when the realities all around us speak to the contrary. used, annih 
We are inured to scenes of mass destruction. Having seen the indescribable on so his ever hal 
many occasions, we have become anesthetized to its impact. One more indescribable capacity to 
is tantamount to watching an old commercial ­ it is perceived as a rerun, time to the insanit) 
switch channels. over and th 
In the early 1990s, the West, especially the European strand, watched nightly century, rei 
reports of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (euphemism for genocide) and the hidden ous endeav 
concentration camps, heard repeated accounts of the rape of Muslim women by 
Serbian militias, and yet it stood idly by, allowed the indescribable to happen before 
its eyes, and people had their suppers. Ethnic cleansing brought a new dimension to 
Exquisite. 
warfare. Now when you take control of a piece of territory you insure your perma­ At the cent 
nent presence by murdering everyone who might, at any point in the future, pose a gic nuclear 
threat to your hegemony, thus disposing of the threat of opposition.' In a perverse 32,000 tact 
way, it is the ultimate form of conflict resolution. Other cour: 
In our Brave New World, the inexorable flood of information impels us to dis­ albeit with 
miss everything except the instantaneous flow of the instantaneous, thus consigning ons progra 
the past to impermanence, temporizing the search for anything that has meaning. In nology wit 
our rush for immediate interpretations of events as they unfold, we reduce compli­ president ( 
cated trajectories of history to simple story lines that have no time nor room for agreed tha: 
recourse to the abstruse, often confusing, and sometimes seemingly random routes CUffed witl 
that history takes. Unfortunately, immediate interpretations of complex events leave over. More 
little room for unwinding the complicated threads of history. More unfortunately, in place to 
we are uninterested in untangling the threads, lacking both the skills and the casual eaSf 
patience. Countri 
History is located in time and space, and time and space change. Events explained undergrou 
in one context give order to the chaotic and provide the cushion of certainty that is ket is exte 
necessary for the rationalization of the human condition. But for every context there have easy 
is at least a competing context. Selectivity is the barometer of our preconceptions. enriching 
The reexamination of the past, therefore, becomes necessary to reset the equilib­ has a mon 
rium of a given time. Sifting memory's recollections and perceptions, once indelibly with impe 
imprinted on our consciousness as enduring dogmas or ideological constructs beyond exists will 
challenge, is necessary to our search for truth. Permutations of perceptions are a money fr(] 
fulcrum that "truth" needs in order to balance its own mysterious untruths. to develoF 
Thus, in this and the next issue of the New England Journal ofPublic Policy we believe t11 
will look at issues of war in the twentieth century; at how the nature and purpose of have the ~ 
war have changed; at how evil stalks the human condition, how we forget, most tion. Non 
likely because we want to forget. Some truths are too terrible to bear. They require to have d, 
us to ask questions of ourselves that our psyches are not equipped to answer and so missile de 
they close down for the sake of our survival. Had we slaughtered dumb animals in system a~ 
the manner in which we slaughtered ourselves during the century we have left be­ nounced 
hind, we would have filled the air with our wails of anguish and protest. IndeeG 
The twentieth century will be remembered for many things ­ endless lists of twentieth 
scientific breakthroughs in physics, medicine, biology, genetics, and communica­ extinctio 
tions that were unthinkable mere decades before the impact of discovery in these better de 
fields transformed the way we live and think and communicate. Each discovery had The t~ 
an exponential impact on the next, each accelerated the next; the obsolete became tUlY, Zb 
the commonplace. Carter, p 
But with every innovation that improved the quality of life, we managed to find political. 
2 
new and "improved" ways of killing ourselves, not just the killing of some of us but 
the killing of all of us. Our ultimate accomplishment: weapons of war that will, if 
used, annihilate every living being, deplete the planet of Man leaving no memory of 
his ever having been here. And in our madness, we were not content to develop the 
capacity to merely vaporize all of us one time over, but we rushed, inebriated with 
the insanity of our success, to devise means of destroying ourselves multiple times 
over and then multiples of multiples and, still not satisfied, were by the end of the 
century, relentlessly pursuing more deadly means to extinguish whatever our previ­
ous endeavors might have missed. 
Exquisite Arsenals 
At the century's turn, the arsenal of our extinctive dreams amounted to 2,100 strate­
gic nuclear weapons in the possession of five countries and between 23,000 and 
32,000 tactical nuclear missiles in the possession of the same five plus another three. 
Other countries - thirty at one count - are eagerly biting at the nuclear cherry, 
albeit with pious denials. Earlier this year the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weap­
ons program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, "tearfully" admitted to sharing nuclear tech­
nology with a number of countries - Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The Pakistani 
president General Pervez Musharraf pardoned Dr. Khan - although everyone 
agreed that such egregious behavior on the part of Pakistan could only have oc­
curred with the concurrence of the Pakistani military, which Musharraf presides 
over. More disturbing is the fact that, despite all the safeguards that were supposedly 
in place to preclude such illicit transfers of illicit technology, they took place with 
casual ease. 
Countries with nuclear aspirations pursue them in secret using the clandestine 
underground arms networks that are the procurers of death. The nuclear black mar­
ket is extensive. It operates with startling impunity and thoroughness. Countries 
have easy access to whatever they want whether it's raw uranium, machines for 
enriching it, or blueprints for turning nuclear fuel into atomic bombs. No country 
has a monopoly on the technology of mass destruction; technology crosses borders 
with impervious ease; the flow of knowledge is immune to border restrictions. What 
exists will at some point in time be used. Knowledge, as easily transferable as 
money from one account to another in a small bank, cannot be destroyed. Attempts 
to develop anti-nuclear shields mistakenly will make the countries that develop them 
believe they have an "edge," subconsciously implanting another belief - that they 
have the capacity to launch a first "strike," without having to worry about retalia­
tion. Non-proliferation treaties are meaningless pieces of paper (Russia now claims 
to have developed a new strategic missile system that can evade the latest U.S. anti­
missile defense program. "Not a single country in the world has such a weapons 
system at the moment," the Russian president Vladimir Putin boasted when he an­
nounced that his country possessed this "powerful means of warfare"l). 
Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that our sole preoccupation during the 
twentieth century was with developing weapons of war that would ensure our 
extinction. Rather than being the century of innovation and globalization, we might 
better describe the twentieth century as the century of massacre. 
The toll? In Out ofControl: Global Turmoil on the Eve ofthe Twenty-first Cen­
tury, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy 
Carter, provides the following calculations: "Lives ... deliberately extinguished by 
politically motivated carnage": 167 million to 175 million. These figures include 
3 
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war dead: 87 million - military dead account for 33 million; civilians for 54 mil­
lion. Add to that "the failed effort to build communism in the twentieth century 
[that] consumed the lives of almost" 60 million. Stephane Courtois in The Black 
Book ofCommunism puts the carnage of Communism at 85 million. 
Milton Leitenberg2 uses different categories of classification: "politically caused 
deaths" in the twentieth century range between 214 and 226 million; "deaths in wars 
and conflicts, including civilians, between 130 and 142 million; and "political 
deaths" between 1945 and 2000 at approximately 50 million. In short, more people 
were killed by political violence after World War II than in both world wars put 
together. 
In Death by Government, Rudolph J. Rummel, ascribes 169 million deaths be­
tween 1900 and 1987 to "Democides" - that is, "government inflicted deaths"; of 
which "Communist Oppression" accounts for 110 million. The number killed in war 
according to his calculations comes to 34 million and "Non-Democidal Famine" 
deaths to 49 million in China (1900-87) and in Russia approximately six million 
(1921--47). This brings his total body count to 258 million for all categories. 
Matthew White (Historical Atlas ofthe Twentieth Century) uses yet another set of 
classifications "Deaths, Genocide and Tyranny": 83 million; "Military Deaths in 
War": 42 million; "Civilian Deaths in War": 19 million; "Man-made Famine": 44 
million. In all: 188 million. 
Thus at the lower boundary for the number of dead we have estimates that range 
from 167 to 175 million, the upper bounds from 188 million to 258 million. A me­
dian estimate suggests that the century claimed at least 200 million lives in war and 
conflict-related deaths. If we extrapolate a little and assume that three family mem­
bers are directly affected by the death of one other, then we may draw broader 
strokes on the canvas - 200 million dead and 600 million family members who 
have to bear the loss or even bore witness to the loss. In all, 800 million peeling off 
the canvas and falling into the nether world of ineffable suffering or the solitude of 
eternal silence. 
Wars are no longer waged between nation-states; they are waged by governments 
against their own people; by ethnic groups settling historical scores; by minorities 
within nation-states demanding self-determination; by warlords, drug lords, and 
lords who harbor illusions of being lords. The flip side of globalization is fragmen­
tation. When the United States armed the mujahideen with shoulder-held stinger 
missiles in Afghanistan and old men sitting on donkeys with a steady arm, a good 
eye, and the press of a finger brought down Soviet helicopters in the austere wilder­
nesses of barren mountains. The marriage of the pre-modern and the ultra-modern 
redefined the playing fields of killing. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ratio of combatants to civilians 
killed in war was 8: 1 - eight combatants for every civilian; at the end of the cen­
tury the figures were reversed, the ratio was 1:8 - eight civilians were killed for 
every combatant. In the space of 100 years the nature of war itself had been rede­
fined - people with weapons of war now kill unarmed civilians, not each other. In 
war today you are now safer being a soldier in one of the competing armies than 
being a civilian. Armies no longer "fight" on behalf of people; they kill people the 
better to prove the illusion of power. 
The following data indicate that there are no limits to escalation of civilian casu­
alties. 3 The data are based on the calculation of the percentage that civilian casual­
ties represent among all casualties in wars in which the United States was involved. 
In World War I, the total number of civilian casualties was 11 percent of the total 
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casualties. In World War II the civilian casualties were approximately 51 percent. In 
the Vietnam War, civilian casualty estimates run as high as 86 per cent. In the Gulf 
War (1990-91) civilian casualties accounted for approximately 93 per cent of all 
casualties and since 1992, 99 percent of casualties in conflicts in which the United 
States was involved. In the argot, "collateral damage" manages to rob the dead of 
their humanity. 
In the early nineteenth century, Karl von Clausewitz famously wrote that "war is 
merely a continuation of politics by other means," and for more than a century he 
was quoted approvingly or disapprovingly. In the twentieth century, Isaiah Berlin 
wrote that, "Men do not live by fighting evils. They live by positive goals." Unfor­
tunately, one man's positive goal is another man's evil. The proliferation of suicide 
bombers adds a new dimension - the personal "acts of war" of ordinary people can 
provoke consequences across the political spectrum, derail attempts to negotiate 
across huge barriers of distrust. In the Middle East, Palestinian suicide bombers and 
Israeli retaliations have reduced the Road Map to virtual irrelevancy. Ariel Sharon's 
wall, which suicide bombers will effortlessly bypass, has merely put further ob­
stacles in the way of a lasting peace. Walls are easy to erect but difficult to tear 
down. One may be an act of defense; the other is seen as an act of defeat. The re­
sentment and anger Sharon's wall has ignited among Palestinians will only swell the 
ranks of suicide bombers. The wall is an advertisement for enlistment. 
The suicide bomber needs no technology to carry out his acts, putting at a disad­
vantage societies that rely on advanced technology to secure their safety; the acts of 
terror that elude them take place beneath their lowest security thresholds. Terrorist 
groups, equipped with modern technology, can communicate among cells located 
within several sovereign states. They are not only extraordinarily elusive, they are 
recombinant. 
There is no antidote to a determined suicide bomber. Rather than being the acts of 
aberrant fanatics eagerly courting martyrdom in order to luxuriate in the hereafter in 
the embrace of heaven knows how many virgins - as much of the West would wish 
to believe - suicide bombers are now more numerous than ever, and are increas­
ingly ordinary people who look forward to committing their acts of life transcen­
dence. In Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, 
sought the help of Al Qaeda in waging a "sectarian war" on Shiites there. Having 
already directed some 25 suicide bombings in Iraq, he was ready to direct more. 
Within two days of the document outlining his plans being uncovered, two massive 
suicide bombings killed more than one hundred Iraqis. Within weeks, two more ­
in Karbala and Baghdad outside Shiite mosques on one of the Shiite's holiest days 
- killed at least one hundred eighty worshippers in the bloodiest day since the over­
throw of Saddam Hussein. As is being shown in Iraq, "shock and awe," reliance on 
the super sophisticated electronically guided precision weapons and satellite surveil­
lance, may allow the United States to conquer but not to win. They count for little 
when resistance resorts to the most primitive methods of retaliation, not for the sake 
of defeating the vastly superior military power, but simply to create mayhem and 
undermine absolutely people's sense of security. 
The purpose of war is no longer to defeat an "enemy," but simply to kill. Killing 
is an end in itself, not the means to achieve some purpose. What we refer to as the 
"new" war - the war on terrorism - is the incremental extrapolation of what we 
subconsciously came to accept as being "normal" ways to eliminate ourselves. Sep­
tember 11 simply raised the threshold, elevated the level of sophistication, set a 
record to be beaten. And it will be beaten. 
5 
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Nor do we configure into our definitions of war the acts of child-soldiers, rape as buried in 70 
a weapon of war, food as a weapon of war. Often more die fleeing war than in war removed am 
itself. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ORC) - an oxymoron if ever ally. If demi 
there was one - the largest and most deadly war was fought since World War II years and $~ 
between coalitions of African nations, Hutu and Tutsi militias, ethnic tribes, commu­ half of landI 
nal groups, meandering gangster marauders. More than one million people - destruction, 
almost all civilians - were killed in "combat," another 1.5 million died fleeing land to culti 
shifting battlegrounds or psychotic plunderers. They died of cold, thirst, lack of least 100 co 
food and shelter - victims of hostile environments in unforgiving terrain. devices. Thl 
But there were no television cameras to record the indescribable there, and what and $1,000 
does not exist on video tape has not happened. In the West the mention of the DRC 
merely raises quizzical looks. In the civilized West the atrocities committed in the Money for 
name of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia generated suppertime yawns. We 
have anesthetized ourselves so completely that the images of the mass murder of According 
human beings are erased between the starter and the main course. military SP( 
lion in 200: 
growth in r
Nowhere To Go terrorist aU 
The decade of the 1990s ended with 6.5 million more uprooted people worldwide ment wor\e 
than when the decade began, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees Japan, E 
(USCR).4 percent of 
The number of people forced from their homes by violence and repression stood percent anI 
at more than 35 million at the end of 1999, compared to 29 million uprooted people porter, acc 
in 1990. The most dramatic increase occurred in the size of the world's internally tiable; cou 
displaced population (lOP) - people who are effectively "internal refugees" within The rise 
their own country. At least 21 million people were internally displaced at the end of U.S. milit~ 
the decade, compared to 13-14 million when the decade began. The number of of the glot 
countries with significant numbers of uprooted populations nearly doubled during cannot aff' 
the decade - 25 countries with a half-million or more uprooted people at the end of One res 
the 1990s, 13 countries and territories at the beginning. expenditUi 
Although the 1990s were the world's first post-Cold War decade, the end to the 2005 bud! 
Cold War triggered more instability rather than less. More people than ever fled proconsul 
their homes because they feared for their lives. The growing number of internally might ratt 
displaced persons is a problem the international community has not come to grips In The 
with. The displaced are often cut off from international humanitarian aid and pro­ Priest wri 
tection because of insecurity on the ground, difficult logistics, or restricted access dependen 
imposed by the country's government. Internally displaced people are usually the shift t 
trapped in some of the world's most dangerous places, non-people in their own ment and 
countries, where marginalization is usually the common condition of most. weakness 
Population upheavals intensified in Africa during the 1990s. About 13.7 million end willI 
Africans remained uprooted (internally displaced and refugees combined) at the end Priest 
of the decade, compared to about 12 million in 1990. Although the number of Afri­ Cornman 
can refugees declined by about one-third, the number of internally displaced persons had beco 
jumped from 7 million to about 10 million. the Rom 
The number of refugees worldwide climbed by 600,000 - the first significant Rome. Jl 
refugee increase in seven years. The number of internally displaced persons he knew 
increased by four million. Most of the flight came from war or ethnic cleansing. There 
More than 14 million people were refugees outside their home countries, and an­ All wer6 
other 21 million were displaced within their countries. are s 
But the twentieth century left us other legacies. Some 110 million landmines lie power. 
6 
e as buried in 70 countries and a further 110 million are stockpiled. A mere 100,000 are 
ar 	 removed annually while between two and five million landmines are planted annu­
ally. If demining continues at its present rate it is estimated that it will require 1,100 
years and $33 billion to eradicate the 110 million landmines currently planted. Over 
mu- half of landmine victims die before receiving medical assistance. In addition to the 
destruction and loss of life - at least 26,000 annually - there is the loss of arable 
land to cultivation in some of the most poverty-ridden countries in the world. At 
least 100 companies in 55 countries produce 360 different anti-personnel mining 
devices. They cost between three dollars and ten dollars to produce, between $300 
at and $1,000 to remove. 
tC 
' e 	 Money for War = More Money for War 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world 
military spending, fueled by the U.S. war on terrorism, rose 6 percent to $795 bil­
lion in 2002. The United States accounted for nearly 75 percent of the worldwide 
growth in military spending. Boosting its defense budget after the September 11 
terrorist attacks, the United States accounted for 43 percent of all military procure­
ment worldwide in 2002. 
Japan, Britain, France, China, and Germany together accounted for a further 23 
percent of military spending, while Russia and China boosted their spending by 12 
percent and 18 percent respectively. Russia remains the world's top weapons ex­
porter, accounting for 36 percent of arms deliveries in 2002. The market is insa­
tiable; countries that cannot feed their people sate themselves with arms. 
in The rise in military spending "is due almost exclusively to the huge increase in 
~f 	 U.S. military expenditures under the Bush Administration," SIPRI says. "A review 
of the global expenditure trends shows that the rest of the world is not prepared, or 
cannot afford to follow America's example in increasing military expenditure." 
of One result of the massive sums of money the United States allocates to military 
expenditure (the Bush administration is looking for another 7 percent increase in the 
2005 budget, which does not include the cost of maintaining a military/civilian! 
proconsul presence in Iraq) is that the United States now increasingly relies on 
might rather than diplomacy to address conflict issues. 
In The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America sMilitary,S Dana 
Priest writes that during the 1990s, "The US government had grown increasingly 
dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs." Alarmingly, she attributed 
the shift to "a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Depart­
ment and a distracted Congress." The war on terror is all war. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the military institutions whose "mission" it is to wage a war without 
end will determine the outcome. 
Priest recounts how General Anthony Zinni, the general in charge of the Central 
Command - one of five of the military's regional commands _6 concluded that "he 
had become a modern-day proconsul, descendant of the warrior statesmen who ruled 
the Roman Empire's outlying territory, bringing order and ideals from a legalistic 
Rome. Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus would have understood. His compatriots 
he knew did not." 
There were 21 major armed conflicts in 19 locations around the world in 2002. 
All were internal conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, internal conflicts invariably 
are struggles over control of exploitable resources and access to wealth and political 
power. Ethnic and religious differences often exacerbate or underlie such conflicts, 
7 
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making them even more volatile. Civilians are perceived either as threats, in case depl 
they support the "other" side - or as a potential source of new supporters. Thus, 
DeSIthey are often key targets for combatants on all sides. 
in reIn many internal conflicts, combatants have no compunction using the most ne­
arnefarious techniques of warfare, including torture, demonstration killings, and maim­
asscing (as in Sierra Leone), or the wholesale expulsion of civilians (as in Kosovo). The deli 
violence of internal conflicts is facilitated by the wide availability, at modest prices, 

of an array of light and medium weapons. The growing availability of small arms 
 In tl 
has been a major factor in the increase in the number of conflicts. Small arms ac­ tion 
count for 90 percent of all casualties. The global arms trade is subject to no interna­ pan 
tional monitoring or regulation. The United States accounts for almost 75 percent of 
all exports of small arms. On 
Armed groups are increasingly forcing child soldiers to fight. The SIPRI report gO\ 
estimated that in 2000 about 10 percent of all combatants worldwide were under pot 
eighteen years of age - a trend that is likely to increase in coming years. As re­
cently as February 2004, the "child army"of the Lord's Resistance Army, most of M~ 
in!them no more than ten or eleven years old, massacred 200 civilians in northern 
Uganda, one more atrocity in a seventeen-year-old civil war where the rebel army is kel 
hu
made up mostly of abducted children.7 
rn,
Refugee and IDP camps have been used as bases for operations by combatants in 
air 
countries such as Burundi, DRC, Liberia, and Pakistan, increasing the risks for camp 
or 
populations and relief workers alike. 
Contending forces in a number of conflicts use relief as a weapon of war. In 
NatilSomalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, warring factions sys­
tematically regulated the flow of food into specific areas to weaken public support manitaI 
globalfor their opponents or to strengthen support for their own side. 
humaniGenocidal conflicts aimed at annihilating all or part of a racial, religious, or eth­
nic group, and conflicts caused by other crimes against humanity - such as forced, tion to 
Thelarge-scale expUlsions of populations - generate massive humanitarian needs. 
the COlHumanitarian emergencies generated by such conflicts typically produce sudden 
and especially large movements of refugees and IDPs, with accompanying emer­ in Gen 
gency needs for food and shelter, as in Kosovo and Rwanda. Such conflicts evoke vided I 
the most visceral emotional responses from victims and perpetrators alike~ thus, the averag 
political, economic, and social conditions that provoke such conflicts are likely to be questel 
Fununusually persistent. Most countries experiencing such conflicts in the last decade 
(my it:have yet to restore their pre-conflict growth, while reconciliation between antago­
nists has proven elusive. agenci 
relian(In a review of global security, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimated 
assist,that in 2002 the overall number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assis­
FOItance worldwide - including IDPs, refugees, and others in refugee-like situations 
maniti
- was approximately 42 million compared to 36 million in 1998. 
Consensual humanitarian responses, it concludes, are substantially more numerous do~o~ 
tegle Ithan forceful humanitarian interventions against the will of a local government or 
local combatants. Government and international humanitarian agencies and nongov­ Cent 
ernmental organizations (NGOs) often will attempt to deliver relief to civilian relati 
groups at risk, but many governments will continue to be highly wary of forceful the 0 
humanitarian interventions: mand 
ofth( 
Tf 
Major Western donor countries will increasingly invest in a range of conflict-prevention nars,
efforts as well as political and economic initiatives in post-conflict settings, rather than 
8 
aim­
). The 
rices, 
rms 
ac­
tema­
ent of 
port 
r 
e-
t of 
my is 
ts in 
camp 
Vs­
ort 
len 
:e 
the 
o be 
ed 
is­
ous 
v-
deploy military forces during the course of a conflict. 
Despite some improvement in the responsiveness and capacity of humanitarian agencies 
in recent years, limits imposed by budgetary constraints and bureaucratic competition 
among the major UN agencies and international NGOs ­ as well as the problems 
associated with operating in conflict situations - will continue to hamper the effective 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
In the absence of adequate security, an increasing number of UN agencies, the Interna­
tional Committee of the Red Cross, and NGOs will withdraw, at least temporarily, from 
particularly dangerous humanitarian operations. 
On the other hand, the assertion ojthe right to non-interference by many important G8 
governments and their citizens will continue to act as a brake on early action in a 
potential humanitarian emergency (my italics). 
Many governments have marginally improved their military capabilities for intervention 
in the past decade. These units ­ primarily equipped for combat and trained for peace­
keeping and peace enforcement missions ­ may be made available to respond to global 
humanitarian emergencies. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Ger­
many, Ukraine, and Russia will remain the only countries with the long-range military 
airlift capabilities required to deliver bulk humanitarian aid in large, sudden emergencies 
or where humanitarian access is denied to large populations.8 
National governments provide the lion's share of financing for emergency hu­
manitarian relief, with OECD countries providing more than 80 percent of total 
global funding in recent years. Available data suggest that international funding for 
humanitarian emergencies totaled more than $5 billion in 2000 ­ a pittance in rela­
tion to needs; countries simply lack the resources to become involved. 
The funding of UN Consolidated Appeals ­ a mechanism of the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
in Geneva to coordinate agency budget requests for a given emergency ­ has pro­
vided roughly 25 to 30 percent of overall humanitarian funding in recent years. On 
average, since 1992 the Appeals have received only 69 percent ofthe funds re­
quested (my italics). 
Funding through the Appeals declined 20 percent in 2000 compared with 1999 
(my italics), mirroring donor concerns about the efficiency and transparency of UN 
agencies, a shift toward greater bilateral management of humanitarian resources, and 
reliance on NGOs. Most donors now channel at least a quarter of their emergency 
assistance through NGOs. 
For the UN, the shift in funding patterns has led to tighter budgets for most hu­
manitarian agencies and less predictable and flexible programming. Funding by 
donors of specific humanitarian emergencies tends to be heavily influenced by stra­
tegic concerns, media attention, and geographic proximity. Needs in Kosovo and 
Central America dominated the humanitarian agenda in the late 1990s, leading to a 
relative decline in funding for Africa. Africa's share of resources solicited through 
the Consolidated Appeals for 2001 has returned to the 50-to-60 percent level it com­
manded in the mid-1990s, as compared with about 35 percent in 1999 ­ the height 
of the Kosovo crisis. 
The aftermath of 9/11 produced a plethora of books, articles, conferences, semi­
nars, and media discussions about anti-Western rage. They might have saved 
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themselves a lot of trouble had they used as a starting point two statistics: 800 mil­
lion people in developing countries lack "food security" - they lack enough food to 
perform the basic tasks of daily living. The $365 billion the United States and EU 
pay in subsidies to their own farming sectors depress world prices and enable the 
United States and EU countries to dump their food products in poor countries, dis­
couraging food production in these countries and depriving them of export earnings 
they desperately need. 
At the G8 summit in Evian, in June 2003, Brazilian president Lula da Silva made 
a concrete proposal: create a fund for extreme hunger by imposing a tax on interna­
tional trade in weapons. A global hunger fund, Lula told the G8, "would not only 
give food to those in need but would also create the conditions necessary to strike at 
the structural roots of hunger. There are many ways of gaining financial resources 
for such a fund. Taxes could be levied on the international arms trade: this would 
prove advantageous from both an economic and an ethical standpoint." No one 
listened. 
Wealthy countries, especially the United States, impose their definitions of a 
"free" market on the poor. And yet we wonder why the poor in these countries 
might hate us when our food policies alone ensure that they die, that their farming 
sectors are crippled, and that they are subjected to lectures on the virtues of the free 
market. "It is easy to hate a nation," writes Susan Sechler, "where food is wasted and 
more than 60 percent of the pe9ple are officially overweight - as defined by the 
U.S . Centers for Disease Control- when its leaders will not take significant steps 
to help the hungry."9 
If you take China out of the hunger equation, given its remarkable economic 
growth in the 1990s - which continues into this century, despite global recession ­
the number of people going hungry was higher at the end of the millennium than at 
the beginning of its last decade - the richest decade in world history. Writes 
Sechler: "In 1948, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro­
claimed that access to food is a human right. The United States agreed - until re­
cently. At the 1996 World Food Summit, it changed it's position on this basic right, 
reportedly for fear of legal implications. When aid to foreign countries is measured 
as percent of gross domestic product, the United States ranks as the least generous of 
the wealthy countries. And most of the aid the United States does provide goes to a 
few better-off countries, primarily Israel and Egypt." 
In The Paradox ofAmerican Power, Joseph Nye takes note of another global 
development that augurs for resentment, anger, and a desire to strike back on the 
part of developing countries - the ratio of incomes of the richest 20 percent of 
people living in the world in the richest countries to that of the 20 percent of people 
Iiving in the poorest countries increased from 30: 1 in 1960 to 74: 1 in 1997. 10 
The degree of inequality between North and South is increasing. The level of 
anger at the disparity is growing. The young see the enticements of a consumerism 
they cannot access, which is more pronounced because of the global dominance of 
western consumer culture, and they protest. Many are prepared to go further, espe­
cially those who see their own cultures being subsumed by the flood of western, 
especially U.S., culture. The German journalist Joseph Joffe writes that America's 
"soft power" "looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, 
low brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the 
Roman Empire - but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway 
stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over 
an empire on which the sun never sets." Oh, yes? 
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In The Ideas that Conquered the World, Michael Mandelbaum writes as follows: 
The attacks on Washington and New York were acts of war and the war they inaugu­
rated, the American war against terrorism, became the first war of the new century. 
Yet, the war against terrorism was unlike the conflict that began for the United States 
on December 7, 1941, or any other of the great wars of modern history ­ the Euro­
pean conflict touched off by the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth cen­
tury, the two World Wars of the twentieth century, and the four-decades-long political 
and military struggle known as the Cold War. The previous wars pitted mighty sover­
eign states against one another, all of them seeking control of territory. They were 
waged by vast armies, which clashed in great battles ­ Waterloo, the Somme, 
Stalingrad ­ in which the fate of great nations and huge empires hung in the balance. 
By these standards the war against terrorism scarcely qualified as a war at all. The 
attacks thus illustrated another defining feature of the twenty-first century: the trans­
formation, or at least the dramatic devaluation, of war - the age-old practice that, for 
the first two centuries of the modern age, did more to shape international relations than 
any other. 
Mandelbaum simply gets it wrong. Rather than there being a devaluation of war, 
there has been a nihilistic devaluation of human life. There is nothing "great" 
about war, nothing noble. Mandelbaum implicitly subscribes to the belief of 
America as the new Empire, but one that unlike other imperial powers wishes to 
bring democracy and the values of the free market to all people. It wishes to "con­
quer" by the power of the ideas it stands for, and if in some instances the power of 
these ideas requires a little imposition as in Iraq, let there be imposition. People 
who have never experienced the practice of western concepts of freedom, goes the 
argument, can be expected to be resistant to them, much as children are resistant to 
inoculations that are good for them. 
It is an illusion for the United States to believe that it can somehow impose a 
"democracy" on a people to whom the concept is largely alien. The belief that free 
elections equals a parliament equals democracy is one of those equations that is, 
regrettably, wrong. (In South Africa when Nelson Mandela insisted that only ma­
jority rule is democratic rule, the United States backed him; in Iraq when Ayatollah 
Sistani insists that only majority rule is democratic rule the United States says that 
ain't so.) 
Democracy is something that evolves from within the society itself; there has to 
be a collective understanding of the collective good, a concept that takes genera­
tions to nourish; there have to be institutions to underpin it: an independent judi­
ciary and an understanding in the society of the rule of law. Not one of these ingre­
dients essential to establish a democratic order is present in Iraq. There is no soil to 
germinate the seeds. What will emerge is a perverted form of democracy, all the 
symbols and none of the substance. 
There are those who argue that the United States will continue to be number 
one, well into the twenty-first century, even though "in this global information 
age, number one ain't gonna be what it used to be." 
Empire beware! 
11 
, 
' 
New England Journal ofPublic Policy 
is the elil 
meaning:This Issue of the New England Journal 
noble"; I 
of Public Policy When it 
When the idea to publish a couple of issues of the journal on the broad theme of war thony Sv 
- what we might have learned from the wars of the twentieth century that might tells stor 
help us to take preventive steps to foreclose on wars of the twenty-first before they you." He 
got underway - the world was different. 9/11 had not wreaked its awesome havoc, killed, Vol 
there was no war on terrorism and no wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was a genocidt 
consensus of interests in the international community on issues relating to war, the conflict, 
U.N. was the forum in which issues of war were debated and for the most part re­ chance, 
solved - sometimes not satisfactorily, and sometimes not at all. But even its failures But tl 
were the failures of the collective, not of the actions of a single nation riding Holocau 
roughshod over the wishes of the majority. attacks 1 
After all, the League of Nations was established to ensure that a war like World terns th~ 
War I could never happen again, and the United Nations was established to ensure of F15s 
that the likes of a World War II could never happen again. The League of Nations, cal COOl 
of course, watched helplessly as Gennany rearmed and Adolph Hitler thumbed his codes tt 
nose at the League, and the United Nations watched helplessly as the United States fall? Dc 
thumbed its nose at the UN. ability ( 
With the Bush doctrine of preemptive strike, the first parameters for war were encom~ 
established for the twenty-first century. The parameters will change. That is all we human 
can be sure of. That and uncertainty. and refj 
There are thirteen essays in the first issue of this pair. Each author speaks with a dehum~ 
different voice, comes from a different starting point, and has a different ideological 
Causa 
perspective, but most of them come to startlingly similar conclusions. War is too 
frequently the way to establish identity: true in the "Great Wars," in Vietnam, even 
in the Gulf Wars. The latter were American wars and the bitter legacy of Vietnam Winsto 
continues to spill its unholy bile into the body politic. The stain cannot be removed tury?" 
by hollow recourse to new, improved patriotic detergents; the stain of Iraq is begin­ wars 01 
ning to spread, its corrosive impact yet to seep into the polity. But one cannot, in take pr 
time of war, speak out against a colossal mistake, or so we are told. deprivl 
depriv: 
(inelue
Haunting Wars to and 
Shaun O'Connell's "Wars Remembered," is not only a poignant account of what war ences 
did to his family, driving his father to alcoholism and suicide, but it draws on the are dif 
literature of war - the haunting voices of the soldiers who have survived war, who The 
were transformed by its experience, and who struggled to bring balance - and in Marx· 
some cases - sanity to their lives in its aftermath. For most, peace was unmanage­ found 
able. Once having learned the behaviors that war requires, most found it extraordi­ being 
narily difficult to unlearn the behaviors in "normal" society. Life without war was contd 
fraught with perils of survival as much if not more than life with war. For the many write~ 
who define themselves in terms of the wars they have participated in, the absence of and n 
war creates a void. They struggle to find a new identity -and many can't make the Right 
adjustment. cond 
In O'Connell's essay, we hear the notice given, but rarely acted on - John T~ 
Keegan: "The First World War, its course and its outcome, determined the course of 
the rest of the century, ensuring that it would be one of almost unrelenting conflict"; 
Samuel Hynes: "War is not an occasional interruption of a normalcy called peace; it 
12 
is the climate in which we live"; Chris Hedges: "War is a force that gives us 
meaning; war is an exciting elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be 
noble"; H. G. Wells: "War is just the killing of thIngs and the smashing of things. 
When it is all over then literature and civilization will have to begin again;" An­
thony Swofford: "The warrior always fights for a sorry cause. And if he lives, he 
tells stories"; Tobias Wolff: "When you're afraid, you will kill anything that will kill 
you." Here we have the definition of all conflict. Faced with the possibility of being 
killed, we will kill first. When we multiply the single fear by millions, we commit 
genocides. But in these narratives we are exposed to the contradictions endemic to 
conflict, the pain and the beginning of awareness that survival is a matter of random 
chance, life itself a happenstance . 
. But the literature of surviving civilians is sparse, other than the literature of the 
Holocaust and Gulag survivors. Who speaks on behalf of the survivors of aerial 
attacks launched some 70,000 feet above ground with computer-guided missile sys­
tems that are not as precise as their designers would have us believe? Do the pilots 
rsure of F15s, the embedded computer radar experts who watch the images of mathemati­ltions, 
cal coordinates cross their computer screens prompting the software to enter the fd his codes that automatically release "shock and awe," ever wonder where the payloads ~tates fall? Do they ever remind themselves that precision is a statistical concept, a prob­
ability of outcome with defined margins of error, often square miles that might 
ere 
encompass thousands of people within their ambit? How does one gain awareness of 
[II we 	 human suffering, where is the point of "no return" when the casualties are unseen 
and referred to as "collateral damage" - death not warranting apology but 
dehumanization?~;i~al ~00 even Causa Belli lam Winston Langley in "What Have We Learned from the Wars of the Twentieth Cen­loved tury?" advances a thesis that he argues, provides a framework for understanding the )egin­
wars of the century and the impacts of endogenous ideologies, thus enabling us to 
, in take preventive measures to ameliorate their repercussions. In his schema, "relative 
deprivation" and "othering" are the root causes of war in the last century. Relative 
deprivation (RD) refers to the perceived incongruity between what a nation-state 
(including its racial, religious, ethnic, and social components) believes it is entitled 
to and what it actually has. "Othering" refers to assigning actual or imputed differ­
at war 
ences to others to rob them of attributes generally shared by human beings. "Others" 
:he 
are different - not the same as we. 
who The three great ideologies of the twentieth century, Nationalism, liberalism, and 
In Marxism, Langley concludes, "competed against each other and contributed in pro­
age- found ways to the perception on the part of individuals and groups that they were 
Irdi­ being relative deprived. As such, the ideologies themselves may be said to have 
vas 
contributed to the wars we are attempting to analyze and explain." Othering, he 
nany 
writes, "has fueled RD through the use of religious, ethnic, social, socio-economic, 
ce of 
and national cleavages to define conflicts." The Universal Declaration of Human 
e the Rights is, he believes, the instrument that holds the promise for a lessening of the 
conditions that marginalize people and cause war. 
The Declaration, however, is more honored in the breach. More people have died 
;e of in wars/conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century than in the first half. 
lict"; Without the authoritative tools to make of its provisions something more than noble 
e; it 
aspirations, the Declaration of Human Rights remains an idealistic proclamation in a 
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very untidy world. But the steady inculcation of the culture of human rights among Securi 
nations, accelerated by the information revolution, gives hope that progress toward Thf 
the ideal will increase. Hope, however, is a palliative, the handmaiden to misbegot­ but to 
ten assumptions. might 
it is s~ 
cides 
Just War and Just Intervention BU 
In "From Just War to Just Intervention," Susan Atwood addresses a problem that has deceit 
engaged theologians and ethicists since early Christian days. What constitutes the will t( 
grounds for a just war? The emphasis since the end of the Cold War has shifted. The the U 
mindless brutality of psychotic dictators, the mass elimination of political opposition 31. TI 
in non-democratic states, internal dispositions for ethnic cleansing, internal conflicts rnard 
that escalate into mass killings has increasingly focused the debate on the need to held, 
develop criteria for just intervention. No sovereign state has the right to murder its is rno 
own citizens. How, then, do we balance the rights of sovereign states in a global W( 
world that has redefined the definition of sovereignty and the rights that sovereign viabh 
states have in a world of increasing interdependencies that recognizes the interna­ Coun 
tional primacy of human rights? When does oppression reach a point where inter­ rnilit, 
vention on humanitarian grounds should give way to forceful intervention? preve 
Of course, there is no single context. One could make a forceful case for a mili­ H~ 
tary intervention in Iraq on the ground that Saddam Hussein was ruthlessly extermi­ a yea 
nating Kurds and Shiites, but the UN would hardly have backed such a resolution. Arist 
Besides the destabilization such an intervention would bring to triggering perhaps Unit( 
even more repression in neighboring countries, it would have required a prior debate With 
to reach consensus on the grounds that would justify such an intervention, one that 
-n 
would henceforth be universally applied. The major redefinitions of international rnilit 
law would have ramifications, difficult to apply and impossible to enforce. We are POW( 
faced with what Kofi Annan refers to as "problems without passports" - that re­ one 1 
quire a serious review of the existing framework for the just use of force . veile 
"The challenge of this next, global century," Atwood concludes, "is to improve outce 
the implementation of humanitarian interventions and to define their mandate, as A 
well as to clarify international human rights law. At a moment in history when, Unit 
increasingly, even local conflicts have global implications, abandoning the pursuit of dow 
justice within or across state borders in an attempt to recapture an illusion of order, trati( 
is not an option." once 
Which, of course, leads us to the role of the United Nations in the new unipolar toral 
world where the United States reserves to itself the right to do pretty much what it the' 
wants to, yet perhaps is learning in the aftermath of the war in Iraq that it, too, is seen 
part of an interdependent world and thus dependent on the rest of the international A 
community to bring order out of the continuing chaos there. strw 
fom 
The UN and ICC 
Robert Weiner examines how the UN has tried to adapt to a post-Cold War era, and 
now to a post-91l1 era. It was poorly equipped to do either. He notes the dichotomy 
in the UN Charter - although the UN was created to prevent war, member states 
could not agree that there should be a permanent UN international army, thus requir­
ing it to improvise ways to deal with wars. Peacekeeping - never mentioned in the 
charter - had to be invented. The UN, for forty years the proxy battleground for 
competing ideologies, is still locked into the decisions or the lack of decision by the 
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The United Nations can be easily faulted for "sins" of omission and commission, 
but to properly judge it one would have to construct a context of what the world 
might look like had the UN not existed. On that level, speculative though it may be, 
it is safe to posit that the world is a safer place ­ not that the victims of the geno­
cides in Bosnia and Rwanda would agree. 
But in the aftermath of this disastrous war in Iraq, a war of immense hubris and 
deceit, the UN finds itself in a new position of strength but one it must muster the 
will to take advantage of. The United States has had to do an about-face and solicit 
the UN's aid to bring legitimacy to its efforts to transfer sovereignty to Iraq by June 
31. The French and Germans, the powerhouses of the European Union, no longer 
march to the U.S. tune, and the more evidence emerges that the United States with­
held vital arms' inspection information from the UN, the more the U.S. dominance 
is morally undermined. 
Weiner's proposals for reform will not come easily. But if the UN is to become a 
viable instrument for the prevention of conflict, it must democratize the Security 
Council, which continues to reflect a Cold War composition, and develop a flexible 
military peacekeeping capability and concomitant instruments that will enable it to 
prevent potential conflicts from developing. 
Haiti is a case in point, Both the UN and the united States were aware for at least 
a year that public discontent with the government of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide was heating up. When the discontent boiled in late February 2004, the 
United States opined that the democratically elected Aristide should call it a day. 
With U.S. pressure (and assistance) Aristide ­ no angel of democracy once elected 
- fled the country. Roaming thugs, bandits, residual elements of the army and para­
military gangs sidelined when democracy was restored to Haiti, once again claimed 
power in the name of the people. Where was the United States? The UN? Had any­
one given any consideration to what would follow once Aristide took the not too 
veiled hints to get-the-hell-out and fled? With the slow build-up to the eventual 
outcome, why was the international community caught napping? 
And what is the message ­ if a democratically elected leader, backed by the 
United States loses favor with the United States, he is dispensable and should stand 
down in the face of mob violence and public protest? Is this the lesson the adminis­
tration wishes to send to Iraq ­ that democratically elected leaders should resign 
once mob violence takes to the streets? That street power should override the elec­
toral process? Of course, Aristide did not have a national army to call on to contain 
the violence. The army was disbanded by the United States. Some countries, it 
seems, just can't be trusted to have an army. 
Absorbing the lessons of killing in the twentieth century is germane to recon­
structing the UN, especially wiht an irreversible globalization not quite taking the 
form we have complacently assumed it should. 
The need to reform the UN is germane to absorbing the lessons of killing in the 
twentieth century, more especially with globalization having become irreversible ­
which is not to say that it may not take very different forms than we currently asso­
ciate it with . 
But reform of the UN is dependent on its members' resolve, and if their willing­
ness to meet their financial commitments is an indicator of intent, resolve is want­
ing. The UN and all its agencies and funds spend about $10 billion each year or 
about $1.70 for each of the world's inhabitants ­ a fraction of most government 
budgets and an infinitesimal percentage of the world's military spending. For over 
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significara decade, the UN has faced a debilitating financial crisis. Many member states have 
In additicnot paid their full dues and have cut their donations to the UN's voluntary funds. At 
Council.the end of August 2003, members owed the UN $2.332 billion, of which the United 
States alone owed $1.226 billion (53% in total and 72% of the regular budget).)) statutory 
traordinaIn "Globalization: New Challenges" Cornelio Sommagura, Philip Bobbitt, Ram 
But thlDamodaran, and Robert Jackson discuss what forms these new challenges might take 
States nein the context of an evolving globalization. Their emphasis is on the norms being 
stitution:established for both international humanitarian and military intervention in conflicts 
an overri that erupt in sovereign states, thus signaling a post-Cold War paradigm shift in the 
United SIUN's conception of its role in keeping the peace. While the UN Charter expressly 
tion to thdeclares the sanctity of the principle of non-intervention, the UN now is setting 
tries preclimits on that sanctity of non-intervention. The International Commission on Inter­
goodies.vention and State Sovereignty (lCISS) sets out the principles for international mili­
Valeriltary intervention in either failed, about to fail, or rogue states where conflict is 
macyofready to erupt or has already erupted. These principles are: the right intention, the 
The systt last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospect. Most importantly, the 
prosecutiICISS Commission was unambiguous in two regards: the principle of non-interven­
crime istion yields to the principle to protect and with intervention comes the principle to 
the ICC rebuild. Thus, one of the major consequences of our interdependence is the recogni­
ity were tion that a threat to peace must now include the "feared adverse international conse­
"the ICCquences of civil conflicts involving humanitarian catastrophes." 
tral to th The UN has also addressed the question of accountability. The International Tri­
United Sbunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda specifically address gender crimes 
The I~perpetrated during war such as rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, and forced prosti­
punish ittution, and for the first time define them as crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
organ of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and genocide. The Rwanda Tribunal has 
the treat:handed down convictions for rape as a crime against humanity or genocide. In "Gen­
the treat:der Crimes under International Law," Richard Goldstone and Estelle Dehon examine 
body OVIwhat they call "the tumultuous progress in international criminal law and prosecu­
But tltion of gender crimes committed during armed conflict" in the last decade. Along 
whose Slwith the Tribunals, The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into formal being 
sembly Iin July 2002, and the ICC statute gives formal recognition to gender crimes. The 
legitimaStatute is the first international treaty to acknowledge the crime of forced preg­
ICC cannancy. The question Goldstone and Dehon pose is: how do you ensure that these· 
States is advances deter the perpetration of gender crimes when conflicts erupt? "One possi­
bility," they write, "[is for] the countries in which the crimes took place, as well as 
the state to which perpetrators have fled, [to] invoke universal jurisdiction to try 
those who committed gender crimes" in domestic courts. 
There can be no peace without justice. It is essential to hold accountable those 
who commit massive human rights crimes like genocide. The spiral of revenge that 
underlies many ethnic conflicts must be stopped. A whole society must not stand 
accused of the crimes that its leaders instigated. There must be a deterrent against 
future crimes because without the rule of law terrorism inevitably becomes accept­
able. 
The ICC, as John Shattuck, Valerie Epps, and Hurst Hannon point out in their 
being ~discussion of "Human Rights & the International Criminal Court" has the potential 
miningto hold accountable perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity, whether 
ates a they are individuals, governments, heads of state, or members of paramilitary 
authogroups. The court has jurisdiction in the state where the crime took place, or the 
fightistate of nationality of the accused where those states are party to the statute, or very 
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significantly have accepted its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis for that particular case. 
In addition, the court will have jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the Security 
Council. In February 2003, 144 countries had signed the Rome Treaty, which gives 
statutory effect to the court. "If you look at any case of treaty ratification, it's ex­
traordinary," says Hannon. 
But the United States has not signed, citing reasons of sovereignty. The United 
States never seems to see itself as merely equal to other countries. It regards its con­
stitution and Bill of Rights as being the best in the world; hence there is no need for 
an overriding international jurisprudence (all the more politically necessary as the 
United States spreads its military presence across the world.) But the U.S. opposi­
tion to the ICC goes further. It is actively signing bilateral treaties with other coun­
tries precluding them from signing the Rome Treaty in exchange for aid and other 
goodies. 
Valerie Epps, however, sees problems arising with regard to the democratic legiti­
macy of the Court's claimed jurisdiction over states that are not party to the treaty. 
The system embodied in the treaty provides the ICC with the authority to conduct 
prosecutions when states are unable or unwilling to do so. If the state where the 
crime is alleged to have occurred, the territorial state, is a party to the treaty, then 
the ICC would have authority to prosecute even if the defendant's state of national­
ity were not a treaty party and had not consented to jurisdiction of the ICC. This is 
"the ICC's so-called jurisdictiQn over non-party nationals," which, she says, "is cen­
tral to the controversy concerning the ICC's jurisdiction particularly within the 
United States." 
The ICC will wield governmental authority as a judicial body to prosecute or 
punish individuals. At issue is the nature of the democratic linkage between this 
organ of governance and the national governments. National states that are party to 
the treaty have representation through their own state's consent to become a party to 
the treaty and through participation in the Assembly of State parties, the governing 
body overseeing the court. 
But there is no democratic basis for the ICC's power as applied to populations 
whose states have not consented on their behalf and are not represented in the As­
sembly of States parties. Here, Epps says, it would be hard to claim democratic 
legitimacy for the ICC. The issue lingers and will have to be resolved before the 
ICC can claim a legitimacy that is universally recognized ­ a legitimacy the United 
States is actively working to undermine. 
The Bush war against terrorism is conducted on the basis that if you are with the 
United States, you are against terrorism, the corollary being that if you are not 
"with" the United States, you are somehow "soft" on terrorism, that is, you may be 
suspect. Besides alienating many traditional allies who feel swept aside in the 
administration's assiduous adherence to unilateralism, the United States has been 
willing, in its quest for new allies that will back its all-out war on terror to overlook 
human rights records. As a result, some countries with atrocious human rights 
records ­ Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia ­ are welcomed aboard the war-on-terror 
wagon, ignoring the fact that abuse of human rights itself spreads terrorism. 
The bottom line, Shattuck observes, is that "the war on terrorism as it is now 
being conducted is weakening not strengthening international security and under­
mining, not promoting, our national interests. We are losing the support of moder­
ates all over the world who should be our allies. We are strengthening the hand of 
authoritarian governments who are cracking down on reformers in the name of 
fighting terrorists. We are increasing the likelihood that terrorism will be bred by 
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repression in places like Egypt and Pakistan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia. survivil 
Above all, I believe we are destroying what Joe Nye has called 'our soft power,' our frequer 
commitment to human rights, democracy, and the persuasion of people that those are sectors 
values worth accepting and replacing our 'soft power' with military force to hold an misnon 
increasingly hostile world at bay." and the 
The 
thelessPrevention and Inequality 
of theil 
The U.S. failure to construct a security policy that is not entirely reliant on the mili­ in nee( 
tary and intelligence means to address security issues is addressed by Brian Atwood oped 0 
in "The Link between Poverty and Violent Conflict." He calls for "a new 'culture of where 
prevention' that will reorder resources and create institutions capable of taking coop­ that is, 
erative, preemptive steps rather than waiting for crises to develop." If we are to countr 
reduce violent conflict, assuage its potential, alleviate threats and acts of terrorism, in the 
and address the causes that drive individuals and groups to engage in such acts, we blind f 
must not overlook the far reaching lessons of the twentieth century - the relation­ The 
ship between poverty and violent conflict, between terrorism and poverty, and the rung. 
interrelationship between the two. partne 
Has 9111 given more intensity to the need to act on that recognition? Perhaps, but Margi 
it would seem that most of the intensity is misplaced~ the need to act has resulted in petual 
a continuing propensity to rely on military and intelligence means to address secu­ terrori 
rity issues, rather than in constructing what Brian Atwood calls in "The Link be­
- to 
tween Poverty and Violent Conflict," a new '''culture of prevention' that will reorder cabint 
resources and create institutions capable of taking cooperative, preemptive steps Devel 
rather than waiting for crises to develop." If we are to reduce violent conflict, allevi­ calcul 
ate threats and acts of terrorism, and address the causes that drive individuals and condil 
groups to engage in such acts, we must not neglect the lessons of the twentieth cen­ terror 
tury - the relationship between poverty and violent conflict, between terrorism and "defe: 
poverty, and the interrelationship between them. thinki 
Even though we hear the figures frequently, we remain disconnected from their how t 
far-reaching implications: half of the world's 6 billion people live under the poverty abjeci 
line of $2.00 a day, l.2 billion live in extreme poverty on less than $l.00 a day. By fiddle 
2020 the world population will increase by a further two billion people, most of He 
them in the developing world, countries of poverty and extreme poverty. An aging Sidel 
West will face an explosion of young people elsewhere who face lifetimes of pov­ tive ( 
erty and have little prospect for better lives. Relative deprivation and resource 
deprivation will affect social cohesion among developed and developing countries, 
within and among developing countries, and also within developed countries, foster­
ing "alienation, exploitation, and dependency," the ingredients of violence. 
The phenomenon of growing inequality accompanying global economic growth 
between the developed countries in the Northern hemisphere and the developing 
countries in the Southern hemisphere and the perception within developing countries 
that the developed countries (read the West) are using trade agreements to advance 
their interests at the expense of their poorer neighbors. Atwood quotes from a World 
Bank report that "argues that an unequal distribution of wealth execrates societal 
tensions" and "increases the perception of relative deprivation." This, it concludes, 
"leads to perceived grievance and potential strife." Global television feeds the feel­
ings of envy and resentment that disparities in income levels generate. Violent 
conflicts are most likely to occur within countries with weak social cohesion, that is, 
countries where the informal sectors of the economy are most pervasive, where 
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surviving and protecting one's meager assets require guile, alliances with gangs, and 
frequently a resort to violence. In poor and extremely poor countries the informal 
sectors of society are expanding; adherence to such things as the rule of law is a 
misnomer since there is no rule of law, only the excessive consumption of the elites 
and the petty corruption that survival in the informal world necessitates. 
The link between poverty and terrorism is less demonstrable, but it exists, never­
theless. Terrorist groups exploit conditions of poverty to expand the political appeal 
of their cause and find fertile grounds for nurturing recruits. Yet, the countries most 
in need of aid for development rarely receive it. The limited resources that devel­
oped countries are prepared to allocate to development aid is given to countries 
where the infrastructure offers the prospect for a high return on the aid they receive, 
that is, countries already some significant way up the developmental ladder. Those 
countries at the lowest rungs lack the basic capacity to utilize aid or the aid ends up 
in the coffers of corrupt officials. They have been written off. And therein lies the 
blind eye. 
The rich North must direct its attention to the countries at the ladder's lowest 
rung. The commitments must be long-term no matter how faltering and difficult 
partnerships with the countries at barrel's bottom may be; otherwise they will fail. 
Marginalization incubates itself. Globalization that leaves billions of people in per­
petual freefall is a prescription for violent conflicts, out of which will emerge new 
terrorist groups with agendas of hate and access to the technologies ­ and weapons 
- to give lethal expression to that hate. As a first step Atwood proposes a 
cabinet-level position in the U.S. government ­ a Department of International 
Development Cooperation. Unless national security analysts include in their security 
calculus the link between poverty and violent conflict and how poverty creates 
conditions that are breeding grounds for terrorist groups, their analyses of possible 
terrorist threats will be incomplete and possibly wrong. Military power will not 
"defeat" terrorism; developmental power may. But that calls for a re-ordering of our 
thinking. Having the populations of the West believe that their countries can some­
how horde the wealth of the earth without consequence in the face of increasing 
1tTijr;CA TfU'V'Citj among the majority of the world' ~ population is. an invitation to 
fiddle with apocalypse. 
Hording wealth is also the subject of discussion in Barry Levy's and Victor 
Sidel's article, "War & Public Health in the Twenty-First Century." More compara­
tive data to bring home the enormity of the increasing disparity between rich 
countries and others: in 1960, in the twenty richest countries the per capita gross 
domestic product (GOP) was eighteen times that of the poorest twenty countries; in 
1995, this gap had increased to thirty-seven-fold. Between 1980 and the late 1990s, 
inequality increase in forty-eight of the seventy-three countries for which reliable 
data were available. Inequality, of course, is not confined to income levels; it en­
compasses healthcare, schooling, housing, employment opportunities. Relative 
deprivation, one of the precursors of war, is increasingly exponentially among na­
tions and within nations. 
But this is the rub: the greater the levels of inequality within and among coun­
tries, the greater the perceived levels of relative deprivation, aggravated by the new 
infonnation age. The greater the perceived levels of relative deprivation, the more at 
risk these countries are for violent conflict, especially if they are in the quadrant of 
extreme poverty and deprivation. But nearly seventy percent of conventional arms 
sales go to developing countries ­ the type of weaponry most used in civil con­
flicts. Thus the United States, which accounts for more than half of global exports 
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centuries. Jeof conventional arms and ancillaries, is increasingly arming the developing world, 
necessary fowhich, collectively, is at higher risk of violent conflict. The more arms it receives, 
the conseqU(the greater the risk of conflict. The United States armed 50,000 Islamic mujahideen 
Senator Willto fight the Soviet regime in Afghanistan and the mujahideen transmogrified into the 
and send theTaliban. Some of these erstwhile "allies" of the United States - trained and man­
the earth, anaged by the CIA once upon a time - now find themselves ensconced in 
nations, mwGuantanamo Bay with lots of time on their hands to ponder what it's all about. 
"We have a 
people in th( 
American Pie would "poli, 
foreign war Three articles, Paul Atwood's "War IS an American Way of Life," Paul Camacho's 
Mark Hanm "American Warfare in the Twenty-First Century," and Alfred McCoy's "The Costs of 
slice of theCovert Warfare," address the issues germane to American involvement in war, the 
while the inmanner and means of war, the rationales advanced to justify it, and the 
"God has fl(alliances made with countries and groups with grave records of human rights abuse 
sand years fand how such alliances undermine the value system that the United States promul­
ers of the w gates as its commitment to democracy, human rights, and human freedom. All three 
people," Wearticles are searing indictments of the American use of military power to advance 
teach them and protect its national interests regardless of the cost - not in terms of American 
commit an (lives, but the lives of other people, thus attacking freedom in the name of freedom. 
enter the WiAtwood is undoubtedly the. most critical of what he perceives as a culture of war 
the first OVedriving American foreign policy since the country's founding. America was hell bent 
overall trad in the nineteenth century on "acquiring," "conquering," and "co-opting" other terri­
Assistant S(tories - first in its drive west, then across the Pacific Ocean, and finally into Latin 
and subordi America - to achieve dominance of the western hemisphere and a foothold in Asia. 
and filled u And in the twentieth century, to achieve dominance in the world. This need for 
Bernard Ba hegemony beyond its borders in the latter part of the nineteenth century he attributes 
Byenslavirto America's perpetual need to find markets for its productive capacity and new 
markets ofsources of raw materials for its industrial engine. The "local" economy could not 
destroy our sustain the needs of the working classes without a radical redistribution. The solu­
alread y stration: increase the size of the economy by establishing new markets for American 
what to do products by force. In the latter part of the twentieth century from the need to pre­
economy;serve capitalism and, as we enter the twenty-first, on the ineluctable fallout of being 
predicatedthe world's only superpower, America is increasingly referred to in terms of empire. 
of the gre Some would argue that America as empire requires quite a stretch. However, 
... [on] thseveral books in different ways have recently addressed the question. Reviewing 
countries;"them in the New York Times Sunday Book Review, Serge Schmemann, the editorial 
pear in othpage editor of the International Herald Tribune concluded that what might have 
gravely thlbeen seen even a decade ago as a rather frivolous proposition must now be taken 
and CongE seriously. "Though I have lived abroad for many years and regard myself as hard­
War broke ened to anti-Americanism, I confess I was taken aback to have my country depicted, 
God! Kon page after page, book after book, as a dangerous empire in its last throes, as a failure 
fied: we Iiof democracy, as militaristic, violent, hegemonic, evil, callous, arrogant, imperial 
Good inh(and cruel"12 
AtwooThe American empire, writes Atwood, was not founded on the seizure of territory 
expansimand traditional forms of colonization practiced by the great powers of Europe in the 
extensivenineteenth century but in clearing the routes for trade, opening new markets for 
results."commerce, and discovering sources of raw material. Its vision was fixed on the 
Alaska pIhinterlands of America and the countries across the Pacific Ocean. 
(1898), aTo make his case Atwood draws on the statements of U.S. leaders across two 
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centuries. Jefferson (1803): "Our people are decided in the opinion that it is 
necessary for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean ... but what will be 
the consequences? Frequent wars without a doubt"; the Monroe Doctrine (1823); 
Senator William Seward, a future Secretary of State (1853) "Multiply your ships 
and send them to the East. The nation that draws most materials and provisions from 
the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells the most of production to foreign 
nations, must be and will be the great power on earth"; Senator Cabot Lodge (1895) 
"We have a record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any 
people in the nineteenth century"; Theodore Roosevelt (1904): the United States 
would "police" the Western Hemisphere; and "I should say that I would welcome a 
foreign war ... in strict confidence, I should welcome almost any war"; Senator 
Mark Hanna, Roosevelt's political opponent (1899): "We can and will take a large 
slice of the commerce of Asia. This is what we want ... and it is better to strike 
while the iron is hot"; Senator Albert Beveridge (1902) on the Philippines War: 
"God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thou­
sand years for vain and idle self-admiration. No, he has made us the master organiz­
ers of the world ... that we may administer government among savage and senile 
people," Woodrow Wilson before the bombardment of Vera Cruz (1914):" I will 
teach them to elect good men"; FDR (1941): "Sooner or later the Japanese would 
commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to 
enter the war"; Henry Stimson (1941), "The United States desires that Japan commit 
the first overt act"; Henry Morgenthu (1941): "The Germans will form a kind of 
overall trading corporation and what are we to do about our cotton and wheat?" 
Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long (1941): If Germany wins this war 
and subordinates Europe every commercial endeavor will be routed through Berlin 
and filled under its orders somewhere in Europe rather than in the United States"; 
Bernard Baruch (1941): "Germany does not have to conquer us in the military sense. 
By enslaving her own labor and that of the conquered countries, she can place in the 
markets of the world products at a price with which we could not compete. This will 
destroy our standards of living and shake to the depths our moral and physical fiber, 
already straining to the breaking point; Charles Wilson, FDR's production czar on 
what to do with 16 million GIs returning to civilian life: create a permanent war 
economy; The U.S. State Department (1946): Our petroleum policy is 
predicated on a mutual recognition of a very extensive joint interest and controL .. 
of the great bulk of the petroleum resources of the world ... on US-UK agreement 
... [on] the utilization of petroleum under the control of the nationals of the two 
countries;" Harry Truman (1947): "if by default we permit free enterprise to disap­
pear in other countries of the world, the very existence of our democracy will be 
gravely threatened." When the NSC called for a tripling of the U.S. military budget 
and Congress balked, the issue was resolved in the NSC's favor when the Korean 
War broke out Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, declared (1950): "Thank 
God! Korea came along and saved us ." During the Cold War the issue was simpli­
fied: we had the Good Empire and the Evil Empire and when the latter fell apart the 
Good inherited the World. 
Atwood catalogues America's imperial interventions: "America's territorial 
expansion from 1789 to 1854 ­ from sea to shining sea ­ was the most rapid and 
extensive ­ in human history. It was carried out by armed violence with genocidal 
results." One-third of California was forcibly annexed, Intervention in Japan (1855), 
Alaska purchased from Russia (1867) much of Samoa annexed (1895), Puerto Rico 
(1898), occupation of the Philippines (1902), ventures into Latin America, repeated 
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installations or the propping up of governments that would toe Washington's line, 
intervention in Russia to try and defeat the Bolsheviks (1918), and during the Cold 
War "America overthrew democracies and filled the vacuum with brutal dictator­
ships every bit as criminal as anything to be found in the Communist world." And, 
of course, the Bush administration's doctrine of the unfettered right of America to 
preemptive strikes against all perceived threats to America's national interests takes 
us to a new dimension and raises more questions. 
"Dilemmas of Empire and Nation Building: The United States Role in the World" 
was the topic of the annual conference of the Education for Public Inquiry and In­
ternational Citizenship (EPIIC), Tufts University in 2004. The second volume of 
this issue will carry a number of extracts of the proceedings from the conference. 
Many participants made the case that America was Empire, at least in terms of mili­
tary power, but the new barbarians - Al Qaeda, Inc. - are clamoring at the gate, 
or so the administration would have us believe. 
But what is this military might, and to what ends might it be deployed? In 
"American Warfare in the Twenty-First Century," Paul Camacho writes about the 
efforts to "revolutionize" the U.S. military. 
After reviewing the plethora of theories of new warfare, attempts at implement­
ing some proposals, and the realities of disparate defense bureaucracies competing 
among each other in their own warfare intrigues, Camacho concludes that "the 
development of a thoroughly new Armed Services is a virtually impossible task 
because it would require the complete cooperation of the entire military bureaucracy 
and its related defense contracting corporate linkages." 
It would also require that all branches of the services radically divest themselves 
of a number of functions and then "a leap of faith and allegiance to a type of diver­
sified and specialized set of self-contained battle and civil affairs groups under a 
joint command rubric that would be capable of developing and employing a variety 
of 'plug and play' configurations for specific types of interventions." An outcome, 
one should add, that is predicated on the military making a successful "leap of faith" 
is as likely as Humpty Dumpty doing so. 
The overwhelming commitment to reform on the part of the military brass that 
this paradigm shift would entail is simply not there, he argues. Established traditions 
would have to be dispensed with; career - and career paths - would be at stake. 
New, independent, and equal military force structures such as space corps, civilian 
affairs corps, special operations corps, and the like, as well as the participation of 
other non-war-fighting "civil affairs/nation-building organizational entities - also 
as equals - would be created and control conceded to an expanded joint command. 
He argues that the Army's standard ten-division structure is too large, complex, 
and centralized, which results in a slow deployment and potential vulnerability from 
even guerrilla-grade WMD technology. Others argue that even the brigade organiza­
tion suffers deficiencies in command and control. Remedies calls for the breakup of 
the Cold War division force structure into twenty-five to thirty "plug and play" 
combat groups under a unified joint command. All discussion and argument for 
reorganization, however, butts up against the prevailing social conditions of inertia 
in the military corporate structure. 
Iraq raises serious questions regarding the feasibility of maneuver warfare with 
rapid, mobile, technologically superior troops as the way of the future. Guerrilla 
war can exhaust conventional forces and the patience of the civilian society in the 
United States. There are serious cavets, therefore, relying extensively on hi-tech and 
lightning maneuvers. Another requirement for the new way of war: the ability to 
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deploy "troops" capable of winning the peace. Currently "winning the peace," 
Camacho asserts, "is a slippery concept, but for this administration in the grip of 
numerous imperial-minded Republican political theorists, it apparently means recon­
structing societies in the American image, or at the very least reorganizing entire 
societies until they are willing to pay cultural homage and accept the current lop­
sided agreements concerning free trade as espoused by the global corporations: no 
other arrangement seems acceptable to the current administration." Yet, even advo­
cating or accepting this as a national policy to pursue globally, the U.S. has no na­
tion-building "divisions." 
Alfred McCoy 's article "The Costs of Covert Warfare" raises disturbing questions 
about the conduct of American foreign policy in Asia during the last forty years, 
especially with regard to the CIA's covert wars; the alignment of the CIA with drug 
lords; how the CIA tolerates and even facilitates drug trade in opium and heroin and 
follows a policy of intervention that destroys whole local economies leaving the 
indigenous population no recourse but to grow heroin and opium; the use of air 
power in place of infantry to subdue territory; proportionality with regard to the use 
of force and perceived threat; the lack of accountability and oversight that leaves the 
American people completely in the dark about what wars its government is conduct­
ing, how these wars are being fought, the wholesale violations of international law 
they spawn, the devastation of countries, displacement of people and what might be 
the two million innocent people slaughtered by U.S. air strikes that literally were 
intended to bomb peoples back to the Stone Age. His account of these covert wars is 
a chronicle of devastation and loss that cries out for public exposure. If you want to 
find a rationale for why terrorists want to kill Americans, you need go little further 
than read McCoy's article. If you wish to see warfare "as an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth," you will more easily understand why anti-America sentiments are 
so virulent among so many people in so many countries. 
The unintended consequences of these covert wars included ethnic conflicts 
spreading westward from Pakistan to the weak nations in former parts of the USSR 
to the Balkans, with drug mafias that supply their European and American markets, 
and plough their profits into trafficking in the illegal arms market. In Kosovo, 
NATO troops faced Kosovaur militias, financed · by illicit drug activities that could 
be traced to CIA-backed drug warlords in Afghanistan. 
Over the last fifty years the United States fought four covert wars in which spe­
cial operations forces combined with airpower took the place of conventional ground 
troops. These covert wars were not subject to Congressional oversight and conven­
tional diplomacy. "Their battlegrounds become the black holes of political instabil­
ity." In highland Asia, while these covert wars were fought, CIA protection trans­
formed tribal warlords into powerful drug lords linked to international markets. 
American foreign policy was carried out in clandestine ways, beyond the scrutiny of 
international laws and most probably in serious violations of many. "In the waste­
land that is the aftermath of such wars," writes McCoy, "only opium seems to 
flower, creating regions and whole nations with a lasting dependence on the interna­
tional drug traffic." 
These wars ­ Burma in the 1950s, Laos in the 1960s and 1970s, and Afghanistan 
twice: in the 1980s, to force a Soviet withdrawal and after 9111 to overthrow the 
Taliban ­ led to the enunciation and implementation of new military doctrines that 
became the hallmark of American foreign policy. Massive airpower and the use of 
tribal mercenaries should take the place of sending in conventional war troops. 
One case: In Northern Laos, the CIA led a secret war of 30,000 Hmong merce­
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naries in covert war against Communist guerillas. "Simultaneously, the U.S. Air Bush admin 
Force fought the largest air war in military history over Laos, dropping 2.1 million insufficient 
tons ofbombs (my italics) on this tiny, impoverished nation ­ an amount equiva­ the bombin! 
lent to that dropped on Germany and Japan by the Allied powers in all of World War Tanzania, al 
II (my italics). Although the bulk of this tonnage was dropped on the Ho Chi Minh twelve Arne 
trail in the jungles of southern Laos, the U.S. Air Force blocked the annual Commu­ administrati 
nist offensives on the capital Vientiane by dropping five hundred thousand tons on fused throul 
populated areas surrounding the strategic Plain of Jars in northern Laos." All agree 
"This massive bombardment of northern Laos ­ over three times the conven­ assistance tc 
tional tonnage dropped on Japan in World War II (my italics) ­ made a wasteland find its feet 
of this narrow, forty-mile plain and its fifty thousand peasants, bamboo villages, port from tt 
market towns, and medieval Buddhist temples. 'By 1968 the intensity of the bomb­ for Africa's 
ings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages,' wrote UN advisor growth, der 
George Chapelier who interviewed refugees from this air war. 'The villages moved . since the be 
.. deeper and deeper into the forest as the bombing reached its peak in 1969 when Salaam, Tal 
jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationery structures. Nothing was left stand­ including t, 
ing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They farmed only at night. priority in t 
All of the informants, without any exception, had his village completely de­ ests are far 
stroyed.'" to.30 
When the United States withdrew from Laos in 1974, it left behind a "waste­ But in tt 
land." Over two tons ofbombs per inhabitant (my italics) were dropped, over of its own I 
200,000 people killed, 3,500 villages destroyed, and 750,000 people ­ a quarter of they did wi 
the population ­ became internal refugees. and holier-I 
The Laos experience incubated a new military doctrine: War without casualties: slaughtered 
air power to replace troops on the ground. Pulverize the enemy into submission with throughout 
an array of technical wizardry from 70,000 plus feet up ­ a perfect military doc­ European I 
trine for a country that didn't mind going to war as long as none of its troops were by the enOl 
killed. Hence its deployment in U.S. interventions in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and still prepan 
Afghanistan. more death 
And the drug traffic? colonial po 
"After CIA intervention in the 1950s, Burma's opium production rose from eigh­ as Nazism 
teen tons in 1958 to six hundred tons in 1970. During the CIA's covert war of the In the CI 
1980s, Afghanistan's harvest increased from an estimated one hundred tons in 1971 how the B 
to two thousand tons in 1991 and then kept rising to 4,600 tons in the war's after­
math. A decade after the end of the Cold War, the CIA's three covert battlegrounds 
along the 5,000-mile span of the Asian opium zone ­ Afghanistan, Burma, and 
Laos ­ were, in that order, the world's three leading opium producers." 
An African Perspective 
Africa is different; especially sub-Sahara Africa where HIV/AIDS is rampant, con­
flict a constant, and extreme poverty pervasive. Africa is the "forgotten continent." 
It attracts marginal direct foreign investment (FDI); lacks infrastructure and thus the 
capacity to use foreign aid effectively; is at the whim of nature, which subjects it to 
devastating droughts and famine; and is in a continual uphill struggle to create the 
social and economic floor to promote sustainable development. 
The discovery of oil in the seas off Angola and West Africa gives it a new strate­
gic importance to the United States, which is beginning to reduce its own reliance 
on oil from the Middle East and substitute oil from off shore West Africa. HIV I 
AIDS has been identified by the CIA as a threat to U.S. national interests and the 
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Bush administration has committed some $15 billion to curb the pandemic ­ an 
insufficient sum, but at least an acknowledgment of the problem. Moreover, since 
the bombings, later traced to Al Qaeda, outside the u.s. embassies in Dar e Salaam, 
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya killed two hundred twenty-four people including 
twelve Americans, the Horn of Africa is among the high priority regions in the Bush 
administration's war on terrorism. But American security interests are far more dif­
fused throughout Africa and largely left insufficiently attended to.1 3 
All agree that it is in the collective interests of the West to provide more aid and 
assistance to Africa, promote political stability and help the African Union (AU) to 
find its feet. There have been positive developments, including the unqualified sup­
port from the United States, the UN, the EU, and the G8 for the New Partnership 
for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the instrument for promoting economic 
growth, democracy and adherence to the rule of law in the continent. Moreover, 
since the bombings, later traced to Al Qaeda, outside the U.S. embassies in Dar e 
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya that killed two hundred twenty-four people 
including twelve Americans, the Horn of Africa is among the regions of highest 
priority in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. But American security inter­
ests are far more diffused throughout Africa and largely left insufficiently attended 
to.30 
But in the West, at least, we continue to disparage Africa, as if its afflictions were 
of its own making. And even when civil conflicts erupt, which in post colonial days 
they did with dizzying frequency and calamitous results, we uttered our pro forma 
and holier-than-thou condemnations without a thought to the fact that Europeans 
slaughtered each other in far greater numbers and with a more forbidding intensity 
throughout the twentieth century than Africans ever did; that in their hubris, the 
European powers, which lay in ruins after World War II, humiliated and diminished 
by the enormity of the suffering and death they had inflicted on each other, were 
still prepared to rouse themselves to do battle once again, wage more war, inflict 
more death and suffering on the peoples of Africa so that they might hold on to their 
colonial possessions and assert the superiority of the white man over the African just 
as Nazism had asserted the superiority of the Aryan over the Jew. 
In the criticisms of Africa, we read much about the "Big Man" syndrome and 
how the Big Men of the continent looted their countries, plundered their economies 
and impoverished their people. But we hear little about the impact of misdirected 
International Monetary Fund (1MF) structural adjustment programs, written by eco­
nomic bureaucrats with blinders who were prescribing economic medicine that 
would drive millions into poverty and despair. They knew nothing of the people 
whose futures they played with, nothing of their language, customs, history, tradi­
tions. The population in aggregate was merely one more endogenous variable in the 
econometric model that crunched out the numbers that would determine the 
country's "sentence." Despite some singular advances in the last decade, especially 
after Nelson Mandela became South Africa's first democratically elected president in 
1994, there continues to be criticism of African leadership; to many it remains a 
puzzlement and to some a disappointment. 
In "Worldview and Culture: Leadership in Sub-Sahara Africa," Betsie Smith does 
not subscribe to the notion of a clash of civilizations, but she does suggest that 
Africa's traditional worldview, while not being resurrected in total, has been recon­
structed to answer post-traditional demands and that scientific analysis that 
originated in the West was being reformatted to suit African sensibilities. This, she 
suggests, is the contextual framework that we must use to understand African 
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of African lresponses to crises in Africa and Africa's complicated relationships with the west. 
guage is reeThe traditional African worldview as seen by her has elements of religion, a dif­
by means ojferent conception of time, a belief that "the present world will last forever," and a 
effect on Aiclose link with tradition and the past and ancestors. Within the parameters of this 
With the worldview, progress is "primarily the realization by a given generation of stages that 
states that vothers have reached before it." We should, she says, take seriously prevailing African 
with long-a ideas about themselves when we reflect on African issues. 
rience in filThe individual is not important: "In all of African society, the group is seen to be 
take over nthe custodian of life, of cultural well-being and survival." Many African societies 
communiti<
"put primary importance on the collective strengths of the older generation and 
elsewhere i religious leaders because they are deemed to be imbued with divine authority, 
which they power, and wisdom." Problem-solving in all aspects of life is done in a holistic, 
upon by allcollective manner where the entire community is involved and a high premium is 
ing, HL 'etaplaced on leadership from above. Because the dignity of the person and his or her 
contradicterole in society is paramount, "it is ... unusual to wash dirty linen in public" or to 
erly was dicause confrontations, "especially in front of outsiders." 
used to beThus, when one compares post-colonial realities with those that prevail(ed) in 
they had b traditional Africa, it is easy to understand, she argues, why there is such a funda­
never had mental resentment against colonialism and all the other manifestations of outside 
concepts 0interference in Africa over the centuries, and why "a civilizational tension, and not 
tional plac an outright civilizational clash, persists." 
So, for The division of Africa in the 1880s was based on maps that provided detailed 
called for information about the coastal regions, but very little about the interior, and on the 
systematicassumption that all powers were seeking "a reasonable allocation of African terri­
strayed thtory, which would reflect their general standing in world affairs as much as their 
ignored hIalready established interests on the ground." Most of the subsequent agreements were 
that has elbetween European powers about African territories without Africans having any say 
to a once' in or control over them. 
rest of theApart from the imposition of artificial and unworkable borders in which the Afri­
waters belcans had no input, Smith postulates that the most far-reaching impact of colonialism 
dictates, a (and, for the most part, Christianity) on Africa was perhaps "in the realm of con­
behaviorasciousness, time, and identity .... The notion of an end to time (and its scarcity), 
TheWand of a finite universe (and the anticipation of a Judgment day) as the West (used 
bwe, whi:to) understand them, are diametrically opposed to the traditional African approach." 
the conse So, too, is the concept of the individual's responsibility for his/her own fate as dis­
demandstinct from that of the group. 
Colonialism had a "deconstructive" effect on African culture and identity and it 
deconstructed other African concepts. With a few exceptions, the names of European 
states derive from their ethnic group, from the language they speak and from their 
cultural and territorial identities as they have existed for centuries. But in Africa, 
Smith reminds us "despite identities, cultures, languages, and territorial designations 
that had developed over millennia, a line was drawn across all of it with the stroke 
of a pen at the Conference of Berlin, and a division and renaming of people and 
places ensued .... Alien cultures and religious systems were introduced with the 
utmost cruelty (slavery and misguided missionaries), which ultimately made them­
selves felt in the very core of African consciousness, as articulated through language 
and manifested through alien educational systems." 
Not only was there a replacement and displacement of people, all African lan­
guages were affected: "Those that have not been almost totally obliterated, became events 
subservient to the languages of the colonizers, so much so that in the Organization 
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of African Unity, and since 2002 the African Union, not a single sub-Saharan lan­
guage is recognized as an official language of the organization." As the very vehicle 
by means of which any human being gives expression to his/her consciousness, the 
effect on African consciousness and learning was devastating." 
With the advent of independence, "leaders were supposed to lead so-called nation­
states that were not 'nations' in the sense of a shared language and heritage nor states 
with long-accepted and evolved identities." These leaders, "while having much expe­
rience in fighting colonialism but no exposure to managing a modem state, had to 
take over responsibilities that used to be shared by respected individuals in their 
communities, within the collective framework of the homestead." And, "as happened 
elsewhere in the world, many leaders equated the states over which they presided (to 
which they felt no loyalty because their boundaries and state systems were decided 
upon by outsiders) with their personal identities~ much as Louis XIV did 'by claim­
ing, "L 'etat, c 'est moL" In addition, models of government were introduced that 
contradicted age-old notions of unity and humanity. Crucially, "the role of the eld­
erly was disturbed. Elderly people are now being left to fend for themselves, which 
used to be completely unthinkable in traditional Africa. As 'ancestors-in-waiting,' 
they had been treated with utmost reverence and care by the extended family and 
never had to make plans for old age. As a consequence of "modernity," traditional 
concepts of leadership were affected "because older people no longer had their tradi­
tional place in society." Much. of Africa "fell apart." 
So, for a response to the question as to why no state in sub-Saharan Africa has 
called for "regime change" in Zimbabwe, despite the fact that Robert Mugabe has 
systematically clamped down on opposition groups, ignored the rule of law, de­
stroyed the country's economy, unleashed violent militias across the country side, 
ignored human rights and condoned their abuse, been responsible for a "land grab" 
that has enriched his elite circle, eviscerated the agricultural sector and brought ruin 
to a once prosperous country that set an example of sustainable development for the 
rest of the region, one has to tum to how Africans see themselves, navigating the 
waters between the strictly "tribal" constructs and the Africanization of Western 
dictates, and not how we would like Africans to see themselves, that is, through the 
behavioral norms and value systems that prevail in the West. 
The West demands that regional powers act more forcefully in the case of Zimba­
bwe, while the African mind dictates veneration of tradition, of elderly people, of 
the consensus-seeking, model, and of the spiritual connections to land. The West 
demands confrontation, but neighboring governments, especially one of the region's 
power brokers, South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, have opted for "quiet diplomacy." The 
resolution of the problem should be managed collectively~ Mugabe should not be 
humiliated. Nor should he be blamed or attacked in public. Consensus-seeking 
should be paramount. IfMbeki followed the West's prescription, he would be ex­
pected to launch vitriolic diatribes against his neighbor, implement sanctions, close 
the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, switch off the lights, and ulti­
mately invade the country militarily." He does not do this because, Smith concludes, 
"Mbeki is consciously affirming African values." 
Peace in Our Time? 
"The Logic of Peace," is Jonathan Schell's vision of the steps we should take to 
achieve peace in the twenty-first century. His paradigm is the great non-violent 
events of the twentieth century ­ Gandhi's independence movement in India to the 
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explosion of civic activity that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Schell maintains that we have either one of two choices in trying to maintain lasting 
peace: use coercive power or use cooperative power. 
The UN, he asserts, failed in its core mission, because the world change between 
the time the mission was first set out in the Preamble to the Charter and when the 
UN opened the door for business. The central purpose of the UN was to prevent a 
third world war - to, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The atomic bomb 
exploded on Hiroshima, changing forever the nature of warfare, and ushering in 
forty-five years of Cold War, during which the doctrine of mutual deterrence main­
tained the peace, not the UN. 
But with the end of the bipolar Cold War order and the acceleration of nuclear 
proliferation, the "balance of mutual terror" no longer is relevant. Even with eight 
nuclear states - and North Korea a possible ninth - there is instability in the mix, 
which at some point might literally implode. With the rising threat of nuclear ter­
ror, globalization calls for a new set of cooperative international arrangements to 
preserve stability and peace. 
While the United States, with more military power than the aggregate military 
power of all other nations, might attempt to go it alone, and try to become the en­
forcer of peace - disarming threats wherever it sees fit; flushing out would-be 
rogue states and implementing regime change whenever a government does not 
conform to the new order of democracy, freedom, and human rights according to 
America's prescriptions - Schell has his reservations whether military might alone 
would suffice. He sees rumblings of aspiration to global hegemony in the U.S. "Na­
tional Security Strategy" document with its assertion that in all the world there is 
now "a single sustainable model for national success": the American one of "free­
dom, democracy, and free enterprise." It is a formulation, he says, that, when wed­
ded to the assertion of unchallengeable American military superiority and the right 
to intervene militarily anywhere on earth, plainly sets the stage for attempts to im­
pose America's will on almost any nation; that is, imperial rule. 
But imperial rule has at least three dimensions: military, economic, and political. 
Only in the first is American supremacy unchallenged. Economic power is more 
diversified. The expanded EU will constitute a larger trading block and the new 
ones, China and India, are making there presence increasingly felt. Within fifteen 
years these two will account for 60 per cent of total world output. And Japan re­
mains an economic powerhouse to be reckoned with. Political power is more intan­
gible than military or economic power - winning wars has little to do with nation­
building, something the United States has shown little proclivity to engage in other 
than through short bursts of activity. "Imperialism without politics is a na'ive imperi­
alism." 
The cooperative path to peace that Schell lays out rests on four converging tracks: 
a worldwide treaty to abolish nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; a 
program of international intervention to ameliorate, contain, or end wars of self­
determination on the basis of a reformed conception of national sovereignty; en­
forcement of a prohibition against crimes against humanity; and the foundation of a 
democratic league to lend support to democracy worldwide as an underpinning of 
peace and to restrain existing democracies from betraying their principles in their 
foreign policies. Some of the paving stones are already in place - the EU, the ICC, 
and power-sharing agreements such as the Good Friday Agreement, which provides 
a model for other divided societies. ' 
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Whether Schell's hope is well founded depends on the degree to which we absorb 
some of the lessons of the wars of the twentieth century that are gathered between 
the covers of this volume: either America expands its imperial role, adhering to a 
policy that it alone with "coalitions of the willing" can police the world and make it 
safe for democracy, thus sidelining traditional allies, animating more distrust and 
hatred of America around the world, and generating more breeding room for terror­
ists. Or it can learn from the mistakes of Iraq: the UN, despite its much chronicled 
ineptitude and ingrained bureaucratic inertia, is still the only truly international 
organization we can turn to. We can restructure it, give it real muscle, so that it can 
playa significant role and intervene in situations where conflicts threaten or erupt, 
or we can allow it to atrophy. The UN should have a permanent peacekeeping force, 
capable of being rapidly deployed. Issues that threaten the security interests of one 
nation can be discussed and resolved. The webs of interdependence that connect us 
collectively can be our salvation. We must address the issues of economic inequality: 
this has been said so often that to repeat it once more has the hollow resonance of 
cliche. We will not do so until some act of senseless and savage violence ­ 9111 
multiplied many times over ­ jolts us to our senses. Perceptions of grievance fuel 
conflict. Perceptions of relative deprivation fuel conflict. Investment in nation­
building requires a long-term commitment ­ an international effort. The West 
continues to playa dangerous, duplicitous game. On the one hand it expresses its 
concerns about the growing inequality between South and North; on the other hand, 
it continues to equivocate on the question of agricultural subsidies that keep the 
products of the South out of northern markets and allow the North to dump excess 
production into southern markets. In the Southern hemisphere, local production is 
made uncompetitive and local farmers are put out of business. 
I could go on with lists of things that should be done, but most are already in the 
public realm. Our problem is not that there are too few instruments of conflict pre­
vention available, but that the collective will to act, to intervene where fellow hu­
man beings are being slaughtered, remains elusive. We still yawn between the starter 
and the main course. 
Gratitude 
I thank the many people who have made the two issues that comprise this volume 
possible: Our contributors, many of whom had to bear with numerous delays as we 
weaved our way through budget cuts, institutional reorganization, and other factors 
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We have to choose, he concludes: "the path of cataclymic violence charted in the 
twentieth century and now resumed in the twenty first" or "a new, cooperative po­
litical path." His message is one of hope: "In our age of sustained democratic revolu­
tion, the power that governments inspire through fear remains under constant chal­
lenge by the power that flows from people's freedom to act in behalf of their inter­
ests and beliefs. Whether one calls this power cooperative power or something else, 
it has, with the steady widening and deepening of the democratic spirit, over and 
over bent great powers to its will . Its point of origin is the heart and mind of each 
ordinary person." 
Schell's idealism shimmers on paper. But idealism rarely knocks realpolitik off 
the merry-go-round of sovereign states that express their national interests in terms 
of competition rather than cooperation. 
A Final Observation 
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that slowed progress on many fronts. Our staff, especially Pat Peterson whose 
persistence, professionalism and indefatigable enthusiasm ensured that we could not 
fail; Matt Vasconcellos and Jamie Ennis who stepped into the position of Design 
Coordinator when Matt left to go to law school; and Bob Geary who helped out in 
emergencies, and Erica White who participated in the early stages of our delibera­
tions and Sandy Blanchette for keeping us in the budget "loop" and Ed Beard for 
being there. But one person was indispensable to this effort. Paul Atwood gave 
unstintingly of himself, pursued contributors and would-be contributors tenaciously, 
and provided a vision for the issue that was rooted in his military experience. 
Our thanks, also, to the program on Global Leadership and the 2003 EPnC Sym­
posium on "Sovereignty and Intervention" at Tufts University; to Director Sherman 
Teichman, Associate Director Heather Barry and the students who ran the sympo­
sium for their collaboration with the journal and for allowing us to use extracts from 
the proceedings of that memorable occasion. The EPnc program is a truly inspira­
tional educational achievement. The students who participate in it are provided with 
the tools to play active roles in their communities, whether at the local, national or 
global level. Its graduates can be found in Kosovo, Iraq, Sri Lanka - wherever 
there is the need for man to reach out to his fellow man. We look forward to further 
engagements with EPnc. 
Yogi Berra once famously said that "If you don't go to the other guy's funeral he 
ain't gonna go to yours." Similarly, if we don't learn the lessons of war from the 
twentieth century, we won't have to learn the lessons from the twenty-first. ~g 
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